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ABSTRACT 
An Analysis of the Work Related Fatalities in Utah as 
Reported to the Utah Industrial Commission 
for the Years 1976-1978 
by 
Dale A. Swiss, Master of Science 
Utah State University, 1979 
Major Professor: Dr. Austin G. Loveless 
Department: Industrial and Technical Education 
It was the objective of this study to determine the common 
denominators involved with the work-related fatalities and their 
strengths. 
viii 
An analysis using the x2 statistic was conducted on all the work-
related fatalities reported to the Utah Industrial Commission during 
the period January 1, 1976, through December 31, 1978. 
It was determined that Age and Time on the Job were the two areas 
with the greatest significance difference as common denominators. 
It was concluded that there was a need for training programs to offset 
the effects of both age and time on the job. 
(69 pages) 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The American way of life has evolved to such a state that people 
are constantly being subjected to the dangers of accidents . 
Heinrich defines an accident as: 
. . an unplanned and uncontrolled event in which the action 
or reaction of an object, substance, person, ol radiation results 
in personal injury or the probability thereof. 
In modern day, the fourth leading cause of death in this country 
is accidents. Only heart disease, cancer and stroke outrank 
accidents as the cause of death.2 
The number of accidental deaths and disabling injuries for the 
year 1978 are listed in Figure 1 and are contrasted to the previous 
year of 1977 by the percentage of change. 
The National Safety Council reported that in the United States 
alone_ there were 105,500 accidental deaths in 1978, an increase of 
1 percent over 1977. Many of the deaths that are listed as accidental 
could have been avoided by accident prevention devices or an improved 
safety attitude. 
For example, research into the cause of motor-vehicle accidents 
and fatalities has revealed that many could have been prevented by 
1H. W. Heinrich 
Scientific Approach. 
p. 480. 
and others, Industrial Accident Prevention , A 
4th Edition (New Gork: McGraw-Hill Co., 1959), 
2Howard C. Smith, An Experimental Study Involving Basic Automotive 
High School Students in Comparing Auto Shop Safety Habits As They Relate 
to Student GPA and to Classroom Safety Instruction. (M. S. Thesis, Brig-
ham Young University, Industrial Education Department, 1975), pp. 13-14. 
2 
CHANGE FROM DISABLING 
TYPE DEATHS 1977 INJURIES 
MOTOR-VEHICLE 51,900 +5 % 2,000,000 
WORK RELATED 13,300 +2% 2,300,000 
HOME 23,500 -2% 3,500,000 
PUBLIC 21,500 -2% 2,700,000 
GRAND TOTAL 105,500* +1% 10,700,000* 
*Deaths and injuries above for he four separate classes total 
more than national figures due to rounding and because some deaths 
and injuries are included in more than one class. 
Fig. 1. Accidental deaths and disabling injuries for 1978. 3 
doing some of the following: wearing protective seat and shoulder 
belts, taking frequent rest stops, driving within the speed limits, 
driving defensively, etc. 4 
Studies have shown that 58 percent of the highway fatalities 
were involved when the cars left the highway; 75 percent of those 
leaving the highway struck a fixed object. 5 
Additional research has brought about the designing of safety 
and accident prevention materials in an attempt to minimize the effect 
3National Safety Council, Accident Facts 1979 Edition, (Chicago: 
National Safety Council, 1979), p. 3. 
4Ann Dear, "Lets Stop Building Killer Highways," Readers Digest 
June 1976, pp. 140-145. 
5Ibid. 
of a head-on collision with a fixed object and thus prevent further 
fatalities. 
Some of these safety protection devices are: break-away light 
and sign poles, crash cushions, continuous guard rails, rough surfaces 
on the highways, Batt Dots, rumble strips, pavement grooving, etc. 6 
As an example of what can be done, California has been able to 
cut the number of highway accident fatalities by 58 percent by in-
stalling Bott Dots, break-away light and sign poles, and continuous 
guard rails along its highways. 7 
The success in reducing the number of highway deaths is due in 
part to research into the causes of those deaths and then taking steps 
to prevent further deaths. 
The nation's highways were not the only place where accidental 
deaths occurred and by the same token research into the causes of 
deaths can be used in other areas as well. For this study the area of 
concern is "work related" fatalities. 
There were 13,300 fatalities and 2,300,000 disabling injuries 
in the category of "work related" for 1978 listed in Figure 1. 
3 
Work accidents are unintended occurrences [which arise) out of employ-
ment. These accidents fall into two general categories. The first 
includes accidents resulting in work injuries or deaths. The 
second type includes accidents that cause property damage.8 
6u.s. News & World Report, "On the Roads: Ideas That Are Saving 
Lives," February 1976, pp. 46-47. 
7Ann Dear, "Let's Stop Building Killer Highways," p. 144. 
~ational Safety Council, Accident Prevention Manual, 4th edition 
(Chicago: National Safety Council), p. 9. 
When an employee is injured or killed while at work in Utah, the 
employer is responsible to report and record the injury or death to 
the Industrial Commission of the state within six working days of the 
time he receives the report of the accident. 9 
4 
At the end of each calendar year, the State Industrial Commission 
compiles the work related deaths and disabling injuries that have been 
reported to them and reports these state-wide figures to the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor for the national totals. 
Work related fatalities and disabling injuries continue to be 
part of the workplace in Utah. Although these numbers have 
decreased in the past few years, occupational illness and injury 
continue to be a major threat, not only to the unfortunate vic-
tims but also to business and industry. Indirectly it affects all 
Utahns through lower productivity, increased workman's compen-
sation and insurance rates, and ultimately, higher prices for 
goods and services. 
Statistics show that approximately 85 percent of all work-related 
i njuries involve human error. So, if we are to significantly 
reduce these injuries, we must deal with human factors - make 
the worker aware of potential hazards which are associated with 
his or her employment.lO 
Often in the process of making the worker aware of the potential 
hazards there are areas missed because of a lack of knowledge of all 
areas of the danger. Hopefully, by studying past work related fa t al-
ities and disabling injuries, the possibility of bringing to light many 
of the missing areas of danger would be greatly increased. 
Every 
D.C.: 
9u.s. Department of Labor : Bureau of Labor Statistics, What 
Employer Needs to Know about OSHA Recordkeeping, (Washington, 
Government Printing Office, 1978), p. 4. 
10
occupational Safety and Health Management Services, Training . 
Programs and Audio-Visual Guide, (Logan: Utah State University; 
Extension and Continuing Education, 1979), p. v. 
Statement of the problem 
The existence of any common denominators involved in the work 
related fatalities in Utah as reported to the State Industrial Com-
mission for the years 1976-1978 has not been determined. 
Purpose 
The purpose of this study was to determine if there were any 
common denominators and how they correlated to the work-related 
fatalities reported in Utah for the years 1976-1978. 
Objectives 
This study attempted to determine the following : 
1. If there were common denominators involved with the work 
related fatalities in Utah for the years 1976-1978. 
2. The statistical significance of the common denominators 
that were involved with the work r elated fatalities in Utah for the 
years 1976-1978. 
3. The strength of the correlation between the common denomina-
tor and the ten Industrial Classifications as set forth by the State 
Industrial Commission . 
4. The strength of the correlation between the common denomina-
tor and the eleven Occupational Groups as set forth by the State 
Industrial Commission. 
5. The implications for training programs as related to the 
common denominators involved with the work related fatalities in Utah 
for the years 1976-1978. 
5 
6 
Procedure 
1. Obtain from the UOSHA division of the Utah State Industrial 
Commission the number of work related fatalities for the years 1976-1978. 
2. Obtain copies of the "Employer's First Report of Injury" 
for each of the reported work related fatalities in Utah for the 
years 1976-1978. 
3. Analyze the data from the "Employer's First Report of Injury" 
form to determine if there are any factors common to the accidents in 
the following areas: nature of injury, part of the body affected, 
source of injury, accident type, age of the victim, sex of the victim, 
marital status, length of time with the employer, time at the same posi-
tion, time of day, hour of the shift, day of the week, wage scale, hours 
worked per day, and days worked per week for the ten Industrial Classi-
fications and the eleven Occupational Groups as set forth by the State 
Industrial Commission; these would then be classified as common 
denominators . 
4. Determine the statistical significance of the common denomina-
tors involved with the work related fatalities for the years 1976-1978. 
5. Determine the strength of the correlation between the common 
denominators and the ten Industrial Classifications. 
6. Determine the strength of the correlation between the common 
denominators and the eleven Occupational Groups. 
7. Determine the implications for training programs as related 
to the common denominators involved with the work related fatalities 
in Utah for the years 1976-1978. 
Delimitations 
This study will deal only with the work related fatalities that 
were reported to the Utah State Industrial Commission for the years 
1976-1978. 
Limitations 
The State Industrial Commission has been using the "Employers 
First Report of Injury," form for the years 1976-1978. Because of 
the lack of data before the year 1976 and the different style of 
recording work related fatalities, it would be impossible to obtain 
the proper data to include the years before 1976. 
Definition of terms used 
Accident type. Identifies the event which directly resulted 
in the injury . 
Bureau of Labor Statistics. The division of the Bureau of Labor 
that is responsible for obtaining from each state their work-related 
accident statistics at the end of each year. 
First Report of Injury form. The form that is filled out by 
the employer and filed with the Utah State Industrial Commission 
whenever there is a serious work-related accident, illness, or death. 
7 
Nature of injury . Classifies injuries in terms of their principal 
physical characteristic. 
Occupational group (11). As set up by the United States Census 
Bureau, Professional/Technical/Kindred Workers, Managers/Administrators 
(except farm), Sales Workers, Clerical/Kindred Workers, Craftsmen/ 
Kindred Workers, Operatives (except Transport), Transport Operatives, 
Laborers (except farm), Farmers and Farm Managers, Service Workers, 
and Protective Service Workers. 
OSHA. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration. 
OSHAct. The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, com-
monly known as the Williams-Steiger Act. 
Part of the body affected. Identifies the part of the 
injured person's body directly affected by the injury identified in 
"Nature of Injury." 
Source of injury. Identifies the object, substance, exposure, 
or bodily motion which directly produced or inflicted the injury 
identified in "Nature of Injury." 
Standard Industrial Classification (10). As set up by the 
Office of Management and Budget of the State Industrial Commission, 
Agriculture, Mining, Construction, Manufacturing, Transportation/ 
Public Utilities, Wholesale Trade, Retail Trade, Finance/Insurance/ 
Real Estate, Services, and Public Administration (Federal employees 
excluded). 
UOSHA. The Utah Occupational Safety and Health Administration. 
8 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Introduction 
In reviewing literature for a study of work-related fatalities 
it is necessary to examine two major areas. The first area to be 
reviewed is that of responsibility in reporting and recording, and 
the second area is that of past studies in work-related fatalities. 
The Occupational Safety and Health 
Act 
On December 29, 19.70, President Richard M. Nixon signed the 
bill which put into law the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 
1970, commonly known as the Williams-Steiger Act (OSHAct). 
The Congress of the United States declared that the purpose 
of this piece of legislation is "to assure so far as possi-
ble every working man and woman in the Nation safe and 
healthful working conditions and to preserve our human 
resources. nl 
When the OSHAct took effect on April 28, 1971, there also came 
a set of new rules and regulations for the employers. Except for 
specific exclusions, every employer with one or more employees, who 
is engaged in a business affecting commerce, is under the OSHAct 
regulations. 
The duties of the employer became as follows: 
~ational Safety Council, Handbook of Occupational Safety and 
Health, (Chicago: National Safety Council, 1975), p. 22. 
9 
1. To furnish each of his employees employment and a place 
of employment which is free from recognized hazards that 
are causing or likely to cause death or serious physical 
harm (this is commonly known as the "general duty clause"). 
2. To comply with safety and health standards promulgated under 
the act. 
The duties of the employees became as follows: 
1. To comply with the safety and health standards and all 
rules, regulations and orders which are applicable to his 
own actions and conduct on the job. 
The Rights of the employee became as follows: 
1. The rights with respect to the standards--the employee has 
the right to begin proceedings for either adoption or revoking 
of a standard; he or she may file objection to a standard; he 
or she may participate in OSHA hearings for a employers' variance 
of a standard. 
2. The rights with respect to information--the employee has 
the right to all information regarding protection and obliga-
tions, all hazardous materials, their medical history and 
exposure to harmful substances, and all information on any 
substance thought to be harmful. 
3. The rights with respect to enforcement--the employee has 
the right to confer with the compliance officer in connection 
with an inspection of an establishment, to special inspections 
if he believes there is a violation, to have his or her identity 
remain confidential, and the right to file a complaint to OSHA 
if he or she feels they have been discriminated against because 
they asserted their rights under the act.2 
Along with the duties of the employer already mentioned there 
came responsibility for record keeping. The OSHAct has the require-
ment that complete records be kept of all serious injuries, illnesses 
and deaths. 
In a memo sent to field personnel, OSHA has explained when 
employers must report work-related fatalities to OSHA. The 
2Ibid. , pp. 23-24. 
10 
Bureau of Labor Statistics had pointed out that some work deaths 
were not being recorded on its OSHA record keeping forms because 
employers were not sure whether OSHA had jurisdiction. 
11 
In a few circumstances, for example a highway death where OSHA 
lacks jurisdiction, it may not be necessary to report the fatality 
to OSHA or the approved state agency within 48 hours. However 
employers must report all work-related serious injuries, ill-
nesses, and deaths in the Log of Occupational Injuries and 
illnesses (OSHA #100 or the state equivalent), in the Annual 
Summary (OSHA #102), and in the Annual Survej Report (OSHA #103), 
if the employer is requested to participate. 
In the state of Utah each employer is required to fill out the 
"First Report of Injury Form" (UOSH 11122) (Appendix) whenever there 
has been a serious injury, illness, or death on the job. The employer 
is required to file a copy of this form in his personal files and to 
send a copy to the Utah State Industrial Commission within five working 
days of the accident. The employer is also required to record the 
injury, illness, or death in his Annual Summary (OSHA #102) form of 
occupational injuries and illnesses. 
At the end of every year each state is required to compile a 
statewide report of all serious occupational injuries, illnesses, and 
deaths and to send a copy of this report to the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics. These state reports are used in making up the national 
report of the work-related accidents, and, for future study. 
Work related fatalities 
In 1978 the National Safety Council and the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics reported that 
Between 1912 and 1977, accidental work deaths were reduced by 
71%, from 21 to 6 per 100,000 population. In 1912, an estimated 
3
"0SHA News Briefs," Job Safety and Health, (Nov. 1974), p. 3. 
18,000 to 21,000 workers lives were lost. In 1977, in a work 
force more than double in size and producing more than eight 
times as much, there were only 13,000 work deaths.4 
Even with the decrease of 71 percent in the amount of deaths 
per 100,000 of population, the number of lives lost per year is far 
too many. The question has been raised concerning what can be done 
to avoid the work-related death. Studies of past work-related acci-
dents have shown that there are three possible ways to help prevent 
work-related deaths. These are: first, more safety rules from OSHA; 
second, better education of the workers in safety; and third, studies 
12 
of past work-related deaths to bring to light possible hidden problems 
in work-related accidental deaths. 
More rules from OSHA 
Almost from the very beginning the 1970 OSHAct has come under 
fire from employers and others who have felt that it imposed too many 
rules and regulations. Unfortunately OSHA has become the scapegoat 
for many problems that are placed upon the employer by other agencies, 
but some of the rules enforced by OSHA do have problems. 
After doing away with over 900 of the so-called "Silly Rules," 
Eula Bingham, present head of the Federal OSHA, was asked if there 
is a choice to be made between j.ob safety and health and the cost of 
providing it. Her reply was as follows: 
We have not often had to face that issue. The act mandates that 
we provide a safe and healthful workplace. The Department of 
Labor is also very interested in providing jobs for workers. So 
we have to look at our regulations closely, because it is a 
4National Safety Council, Accident Facts 1978 Edition, (Chicago: 
National Safety Council, 1978), p. 23. 
serious matter to put one into effect that might require a plant 
to shut down because it can't afford to comply. But a worker 
should not have to lay his or her life on the line just to have 
a job. There is something wrong with that. 
It should not be an either/or situation--either you must 
work in an unsafe environment, or not work at all. We have to 
change that attitude and we have to s omehow catch up with the 
need fo r better occupational safety and health. Catching up 
is an immense problem, because we went for years without doing 
anything about safety and health on the job.5 
Better education of the workers 
on safety 
A second possib l e answer in helping preven t work-related deaths 
is better education of the workers in the area of job safety. 
A Government Study entitled "Target Industries: Profiles of 
13 
Five Hazardous Occupations, " was conducted in 1972, for the purpose of 
outlining the hazards of the five industries with the highest accident 
rates. The industries were--Sheet Metal and Roofing, Long Shoring , 
Lumber and Logging, Meat Processing, and Mobile Homes. The study brought 
out that all five industries had built-in hazards and dangers in 
common and that ". • • a hazardous environment by itself doesn't 
cause injuries, let alone frequent injuries. "6 
The s tudy also found that worker attitude was a problem. 
To bring down the injury frequency rate requires a concerted 
effort on the part of all those concerned. It requires that 
workers have available the safeguards and protection devices 
they need. It also requires that they use them. 
5Eula Bi ngham, quoted in U.S. News & World Report, "Out Go 
Sill y Rules on Worker Safety," (Jan. 16, 1978), pp. 65-66. 
6u.s. Government, The Target Industries : Profiles of Five 
Hazardous Occupations, (Washington, D.C.: Superintendent of Documents, 
U.S. Government Printing Office, No. 2915-0014, 1972), p. 3. 
14 
Unfortunately, when danger becomes a part of the everyday routine 
some workers, over a period of time, become indifferent or care-
less. The consequences can be, and all too often, are disasterious. 
No one has been able to overcome the indifference of some 
men to danger. The attitude of "it will never happen to us," 
is not uncommon among men who consider themselves rugged. 
Perhaps extensive safety training programs combined with a 
concerted, safet7-oriented campaign will help influence workers 
to think safely. 
Along with the idea of "it will never happen to us," the study 
found that "plain carelessness and inattention" is probably the main 
cause of most of these accidents. 8 
Teaching workers safe habits and training them in the safe use 
of equipment is a cballenge that has to be met by every employer. 
What kind of involvement must the employer play in the safety train-
ing? What does it take to train a worker in the skill of "thinking 
safely"? How can an employee best be trained in an attitude of 
safety? 
In 1977 a study using the behavioral approach to safety was under-
taken by Komaki, Barwick, and Scott, to see if the safety training of 
employees in a food processing plant could be positively affected. 
The behavior analysis approach was used to improve worker safety 
in two departments in a food manufacturing plant. Desired safety 
practices were identified, permitting construction of observational 
codes suitable for observing workers' on-the-job performance 
over a twenty-five week period of time. The intervention con-
sisted of an explanation and visual presentation of desired be-
haviors, as well as frequent lowcost reinforcement in the form 
of feed back. Employees in the two departments substantially 
improved their safety performance from 70% & 72% to 96% & 99% 
respectively after the introduction of the program. During 
the reversal phase performance returned to 71% & 72%. It was 
7Ibid., pp. 4.,-5. 
8Thid., p. 10. 
concluded that the intervention, particularly the frgquent feed-
back, was effective in improving safety performance. 
The food manufacturing company was having particular problems 
15 
with the second shift of employees in the make-up and wrapping depart-
ment. Nineteen out of 39 accidents occurred in these departments 
during the previous year, and of the 19 accidents, 14 of them occurred 
during the second shift. 
Several reasons were suggested for the higher proportion of 
accidents during the second shift. The work area was in 
greater disarray following a full work day and there were less 
experienced workers and supervisors.l0 
After determining in which areas the accidents were concentrated, 
previous safety efforts were ascertained and causes of previous 
injuries were assessed. The study was able to determine the following 
information. 
New hirerers received no formalized safety training. On a day to 
day basis, safety was rarely mentioned. No single person was 
responsible for safety. There was little, if any, positive 
reinforcement for performance of safety. Little or nothing 
was said or done by management or co-workers when employees 
took the time to act in a safe manner. At the same time employ-
ees were not provi~ed with opportunities to learn to avoid 
unsafe practices. 1 
After implementing a safety program the employees were even 
having competition between departments to see which area could keep 
the highest safety record. At the conclusion of the 25-week test 
period the safety records unfortunately seem to go out-the-window. 
With no person in the plant to continue the program, the employees 
9Judi Komaki, Kenneth Barwick, Lawrence R. Scott, "A Behavioral 
Approach to Occupational Safety: Pinpointing and Reinforcing Safe 
Performance in a Food Manufacturing Plant," Journal of Applied Psy-
cology, (Aug. 1978), p. 434. 
10Ibid., p. 437. 11Ibid. 
reverted to their previous "unsafe" hahits. To combat the reversion 
the employer made the following changes. 
Continual suggestions were made about plant personnel learning 
to observe, record and post the safety level. Little progress 
was made, until the President saw the results of the reversal 
phase. (In the reversal phase their safety levels reverted to 
the preprogram low of 71% & 72%.) Within two weeks an employee 
was appointed and trained to post data for both shifts on an 
average of once a week. 
Within one year the injury frequency rate had stabilized 
at less than ten lost-time accidents per 1,000,000 man hours 
worked, a relatively low figure. The plant ~ved from last 
to first place in company safety standings. 1 
The challenge of educating workers in safety is an important 
step in helping to prevent work-related accidents and deaths. 
Studies of past work-related 
accidents and deaths 
The third area of possible prevention of work-related accidents 
and deaths is the study of past accidents and deaths. By studying 
things of the past and looking for causes and effects, greater in-
sights are gained in preventing future events of a similar nature. 
At the present time the number of work-related death studies 
16 
is relatively small. A review of Abstracts of Instructional Materials 
in Vocational and Technical Education (AIM), Abstracts of Research 
Materials in Vocational and Technical Education (ARM), and Current 
Journals in Education revealed no studies that dealt with work-related 
deaths. 
A review of Educational Research Information Center (ERIC), 
revealed only one study which dealt with work-related deaths. 
12Ibid., p. 441. 
Although the number of studies of work-related deaths is small, 
their value is growing as a tool in helping to prevent future work-
related deaths of a similar nature. 
A year-long study of the causes of on-the-job deaths among fire 
fighters has been launched by the International Association of 
Fire Fighters (IAFF). The union will conduct the study as part 
of an all-out effort to "reduce the tragic number of on-the-
job deaths of fire fighters." 
The union hopes that the results of the study will stimulate 
further research in effective safety and health standards for 
fire fighters.l3 
By studying all of the related information on the cause and 
events leading up to a work-related death, patterns and similar prob-
!ems can be identified. 
In 1977 a mortality study of the AFL-CIO United Brotherhood of 
Carpenters and Jointers was concluded for the U.S . Government. The 
Study took in the years 1968-1970, and 1971-1972 . 
The Study dealt not only with the accidental deaths but also 
the occupational illness rates for members of the union. From the 
s tudy several things were brought to light about safety on the job 
and prevention of work-related accidental deaths. 
One of the groups of accidental deaths was caused strictly by 
falls from scaffolding. Another group of deaths was caused by 
falls from roofs. A third large group of deaths was caused by 
electrocution either from contact with defective hand power 
tools or from contact with high tension wires.l4 
17 
13
"Spotlight," Job Safety and Health, (Nov. 1974), p. 34. 
14
samual H. Miliham, "Mortality Experience of the AFL-CIO United 
Brotherhood of Carpenters and Jointers," (Washington, D. c.: Superin-
tendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, No. 017-033-
00296-7, 1978), p. 5. 
From the study of the groups of accidental deaths the following 
safety recommendations were made. 
Accidental falls from scaffolding could be prevented or minimized 
by the use of scaffolding safety rails and toe boards. Falls 
from roofs could be prevented by the use of some sort of safety 
harness. Accidental electrocutions could be prevented by the 
use of nonconductive ladders, properly grounding and repairing 
defective power hand tools, and insulation cranes so the cab 
and controls are electrically separate from the boom.l5 
18 
Some studies are done quite quickly after work-related accidental 
deaths, especially when there is suspicion of a violation of the 
OSHAct regulations on safety and health. Such was the case during 
the summer of 1978 when 71 men were killed when a scaffolding collapsed 
in West Virginia. 
A seven-man investigating team from the Federal OSHA refused 
to comment on the accident cause until after they had finished 
"our oyg test, by our own standards," according to OSHA's David 
Rhone. 1 
There was suspicion that the major contracting company, for 
which the men were working, had violated some of the OSHAct regulations 
in the cooling tower accident. After completing their test the OSHA 
officials came to the following conclusions. 
The disaster was a direct result of illegal corner cutting on 
the part of the main company. OSHA accused the firm of ten 
"willful violations," three of which contributed to the tragedy. 
1) The concrete mix wasn't strong enough to hold the scaffolding, 
workers, and equipment; 2) the catheads used to lift the heavy 
buckets of concrete were inadequately anchored; 3) they did not 
use enou~ bolts to secure the beams which supported the scaf-
folding. 
15Ibid., p. 5, 11. 
16Richard Boeth, Don Marsh, and Deborah Witherspoon, "The 
Deadly Scaffold," Newsweek (May 8, 1978), p. 43. 
17Merril Sheils, and John Walcott, "Behind the Tower Tragedy," 
Newsweek, (June 19, 1978), p. 59. 
Although the Federal OSHA can't bring back the lives of the 71 
men who were killed, by investigating the tragedy they were able to 
pinpoint the cause of their deaths and by so doing hopefully prevent 
any further accident of a similar nature. 
Not all work-related deaths have causes that can be located as 
quickly or easily as in the case of the cooling tower disaster in 
West Virginia. Often there may seem to be no real cause or reason 
for the death other than an "accident." A study by R. H. Van Zelst 
that dealt with the effect of age and experience upon accident rate 
has brought out the fact that there are often many factors that can 
influence an accident. 
In studying this accident rate graph (fig. 1) the effect of 
job experience upon the accident rate of these workers appears 
to be considerable for the first five months of employment, 
but seems to be of little significance beyond the fifth month 
of employment. Apparently five months of on-the-job duties 
is sufficient for these workers on this particular type of 
operation to become well enough trained to reduce the accident 
rate to what may be considered normal expectancy.l8 
19 
In fig. 1 the accident rate started off at a high rate of almost 
six. accidents per 1,000 man hours. After five months the rate of 
accidents was down to the "normal expectancy," of 3-4 accidents per 
1 , 000 man hours. (See Figure 2.) 
The study also compared the first group (fig. 1) of workers 
who had not previously had training before beginning their work at 
the plant to those of a second group (fig. 2) who had received training 
before beginning their on-the-job experience at the plant. 
18R. H. Van Zelst, "The Effect of Age and Experience upon 
Accident Rates," Journal of Applied Psychology, (Oct. 1954), p. 315. 
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Fig. 2. Figures 1 and 2 from Van Ze1st (Oct. 1954 , p. 315-317). 
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The data of the second group for their first 60 months of on-
the-job employment is graphically presented in fig . 2. 
Results here follow the same general pattern found for the first 
group . There is almost an identical sharp decline in accident 
frequency for the early on-the- job period followed by the same 
leveling off patern. Of note, however, is the fact that the 
initial accident frequency rate is markedly lower for this group. 
Furthermore, the level which approximates what has been termed 
21 
normal expectancy for the pr evious group is reached after the 19 third month of on-the- job performance rather than after the fifth. 
After having made the work experience comparison, the study went 
on to make a comparison of age groups and accident rates. 
It would appear that age in this instance apparently exerts a 
greater influence upon accident rate than does experience once 
the breaking in period is passed. From the comparison made be-
tween matched work groups it has been found that older workers 
tend to have fewer accidents than their younger co-workers . 
This appears to be true throughout the employee's work history 
when similar groups are compared. Lower accident rates are 
remarkably characteristic of these older men from their earliest 
job performance on.20 
Relationship of the present study 
to this review 
As this review has pointed out, over 13,000 workers are losing 
their lives each year due to work-related accidents and illnesses . 
There is a great need to prevent this tragic loss of manpower. This 
study is designed to help provide some of that need by helping to 
prevent further deaths of a similar nature in the future . 
19rbid., p. 316. 20rbid., p. 317. 
CHAPTER III 
METHODS, PROCEDURES AND FINDINGS 
Introduction 
The data contained in this analysis has been obtained from the 
"Employer's First Report of Injury" forms (Appendix) . which had been 
filed with the Utah Industrial Commission. The data was analyzed to 
determine the following: 1) if there were any common denominators 
involved in the work-related fatalities in Utah for the years 1976-
22 
1978; 2) the strength of those common denominators; and 3) the possible 
implications for training programs as related to the common denominators. 
The subjects 
The subjects for this study were those persons who were classified 
as work-related fatalities by the Industrial Commission, meaning, they 
had died as a result of a work-related accident or illness during the 
years 1976-1978. 
The procedure 
Copies of the "Employer's First Report of Injury" forms were 
obtained from the UOSHA division of the Industrial Commission for 
each of the work-related fatalities. The names of the victims, 
employers, and their addresses were blacked out for the purpose of 
confidentiality. From each form the following information was obtained: 
the Standard Industrial Classification; the Occupational Group; 
Nature of the Injury; Part of the Body; Source of the Injury; Type 
of Injury; Age; Sex; Marital Status; Months of Employment; Months 
on the Job; Time of Day; Hour of the Shift; Day of the Week; Pay 
Scale; Days Worked per Week; and Hours Worked per Day. 
Coding procedures 
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The data was coded according to the following systems: Standard 
Industrial Classifications/Office of Management and Budget; Occupa-
tional Groups/United States Census Bureau; Nature-Part-Source-Type/ 
American National Standards Institute (ANSI): Sex/UOSHA; and Marital 
Status/UOSHA. 
Tables 1-17 are the coding tabulation tables which include the 
breakdown of the number of fatalities in each of the Occupational 
Groups and Industrial Classifications and the percentage representations. 
Tables 18-33 contain the statistical strength correlation 
measurements for the Occupational Groups and Standard Industrial 
Classifications in the following areas--Age, Months of Employment, 
Time on the Job, Time of Day, Hour of the Shift, Day of the Week, 
Days per Week and Hours per Day. 
The percentage breakdowns of the work-related fatalities, for 
the Standard Industrial Classifications, are shown in Table 1. The 
single leading classification was Manufacturing with 22.8 percent, 
followed by Construction with 18.5 percent, Transportation with 17.3 
percent and Mining with 16.1 percent. A combined percentage of 18.5 
percent was received together by: Wholesale; Retail; Finance; Insurance; 
Real Estate; Service; and Public Administration. Agriculture was the 
low rate area with only one work-related death for .6 percent of the 
total. 
Computer 
Code 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
TABLE 1 
STANDARD INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATIONS 
Standard Industrial 
Classifications 
No classification given 
Agriculture 
Mining 
Construction 
Manufacturing 
Transportation 
Wholesale, Retail, F/I/RE, 
Pub. Admin. 
Total 
Number of Work-related 
Fatalities 
2 
1 
26 
30 
37 
28 
Service 
38 
162 
24 
% 
1.2 
. 6 
16.1 
18.5 
22.8 
17.3 
23.5 
Table 2 is the percentage breakdown of the Occupational Groups 
for the three year period. The low rate area was that of Service 
and Protective Services with 4.3 percent. Laborers and Farm were 
next with 8.0 percent of the deaths for the period. The leading area 
was that of Craftsmen and Operatives with 38.9 percent, well over one-
third of the total fatalities. Transportation was second highest 
with 29.6 percent and the areas of Professional and Managers with 
13. 6 percent and Sales and Clerical with 5. 6 percent were in third 
and fourth place respectively . 
The American National Standards Institute classifications for 
Nature of the Injury, Part of the Body, Source of the Injury, and Type 
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TABLE 2 
MAJOR OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS 
Computer Major Occupational Number of Work-related 
Code Groups Fatalities % 
0 No group identified 0 
1 Professional & managers 22 13.6 
2 Sales & clerical 9 5 . 6 
3 Craftsmen & operatives 63 38.9 
4 Transportation 48 29 . 6 
5 Laborers & farm 13 8.0 
6 Service & protective services 7 4.3 
Total 162 
of Accident are listed in Tables 3-6 with their respective percentage 
breakdowns. 
Lacerations, Dislocations, Fractures, and Multiple Injuries led 
the list in Nature of the Injury area with 64.2 percent. Heart 
Attack, Asphyxia, and Systemic Effects carr,ied 29.6 percent of the 
total listed in Table 3 . The remaining area of Burns and Electrocu-
tion was the lowest of the three areas with only 6 . 2 percent. 
Multiple Parts at 51.2 percent was the area in Table 4 which had 
the highest number of deaths. Slightly more than 25 percent of the 
deaths were attributed to Body Systems at 27 . 2 percent. The body 
areas of the Head and the Neck were the injured part 16 . 1 percent of 
the time. The Trunk, Upper, and Lower Extremities had a combined 
total of 5.5 percent . 
Computer 
Code 
0 
1 
2 
3 
Computer 
Code 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
TABLE 3 
NATURE OF THE INJURY 
Nature of the Injury 
Number of Work-related 
Fatalities 
No code given 
Laceration, dislocation, fractures, 
and mult. inj . 
Asphyxia, systemic effects, heart 
attack, and other 
Burns, electrocution 
Total 
TABLE 4 
PART OF THE BODY INJURED 
0 
104 
48 
10 
162 
Part of the Body Number of Work- related 
Injured Fatalities 
No code given 0 
Head, neck 26 
Trunk 
Upper and lower extremities 2 
Multiple parts 83 
Body systems 44 
Total 162 
26 
% 
64 . 2 
29 . 6 
6.2 
% 
16.1 
4.3 
1.2 
51.2 
27.2 
27 
Almost half of the fatalities involved motor-vehicles. As 
shown in Table 5, this code was responsible for 46.9 percent of the 
deaths. The second highest source of injury was that of Objects at 
25.3 percent. Machinery, Equipment and "Other" were the source for 
the remaining 45 deaths or 27.8 percent. 
TABLE 5 
SOURCE OF THE INJURY 
Computer Number of Work-related 
Code Source of the Injury Fatalities % 
0 No code given 0 
1 Objects 41 25.3 
2 Machinery, equipment 23 14.2 
3 Motor-vehicles 76 46.9 
4 Other 22 13.6 
Total 162 
In Table 6 are listed the Types of Accidents. Falls, Struck by, 
Abraded, Body Reaction, and Overexertion led the list with 59.9 percent 
of the deaths. Second were work-related motor-vehicle accidents at 
30.2 percent. A low percentage of 9.9 percent of the accidents were 
in the third area of Public Transportation. 
The ages of the victims are used to classify the work-related 
fatalities in Table 7. The ages of 14- 20 and 61+ are the two lowest 
categories with 7.4 percent and 8.6 percent respectively. The 41-60 
'\ 
Computer 
Code 
0 
1 
2 
3 
Computer 
Code 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
TABLE 6 
TYPE OF ACCIDENT 
Type of Accident 
No code given 
Pall, struck, abraded, body 
reaction, overexertion 
Public transportation 
Motor-vehicle 
Total 
TABLE 7 
Number of Work-related 
Fatalities 
0 
97 
16 
49 
162 
AGE OF THE VICTIM 
Number of Work-related 
Age of the Victim Fatalities 
No age given 2 
14-20 12 
21-40 96 
41-60 38 
61+ 14 
Total 162 
28 
% 
59.9 
9.9 
30.2 
% 
1.2 
7.4 
59.3 
23.5 
8.6 
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group was the second highest with 23.5 percent, and over half of the 
deaths, 59.3 percent, occurred in the 21-40 age bracket. 
Only two women were killed in work-related accidents during the 
years 1976- 1978. In Table 8 the Female percentage was only 1 . 2 per-
cent while the males accounted for 98.8 percent of the deaths . 
TABLE 8 
SEX OF THE VICTIM 
Computer Number of Work-related 
Code Sex of the Victim Fatalities % 
0 No sex given 0 
1 Male 160 98.8 
2 Female 2 1.2 
Total 162 
The marital status of the victim is shown in Table 9. Of those 
who lost their lives in work-related accidents in Utah during the 
three years of this study, 78 . 4 percent were married, 17.9 percent 
were single and 3.7 percent were either divorced or separated. 
The amount of time an employee had worked for the employer is 
reflected in Table 10 . Those employees who had worked for their 
employer up to one year were responsible for 48.8 percent of the 
fatalities. Those who had worked between 1-5 years had 24.0 percent 
of the deaths, and those who had been with the employer more than five 
years were responsible for 17.2 percent of the deaths. 
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TABLE 9 
MARITAL STATUS OF THE VIC!IM 
Computer Number of Work- related 
Code Marital Status Fatalities % 
0 No status given 0 
1 Single 29 17 . 9 
2 Married 127 78.4 
3 Divorced, separated 6 3. 7 
Total 162 
TABLE 10 
MONTHS OF EMPLOYMENT 
Computer Number of Work-related 
Code Months Fatalities % 
0 No time given 16 9.9 
1 1-12 79 48.8 
2 13-60 39 24.0 
3 61+ 28 17.2 
Total 162 
The amount of time an employee had worked at the job at which he 
was working when the accident or illness occurred is reflected in 
Table 11. As in Table 10, those employees who had been on their 
jobs for less than one year accounted for the highest percentage, 
Computer 
Code Months 
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TABLE 11 
MONTHS ON THE JOB 
Number of Work-related 
Fatalities % 
0 No time given 59 36 . 5 
1 1-12 77 47.5 
2 13-60 18 11.1 
3 61+ 8 4. 9 
Total 162 
47.5 percent of the deaths. Those who had been at their jobs for 1-5 
years were responsible for 11.1 percent of the deaths, and those who 
had worked at their jobs for over five years accounted for only 4.9 
percent of the total. 
In Table 12 the work day is broken down into three shifts, day, 
swing, and graveyard. Of the total work-related fatalities for the 
three years, 46.9 percent occurred during the day shift, or from 
8 a.m.-4 p.m. Graveyard had the lowest amount of fatalities, 32, or 
19.8 percent of the total. Swing shift was second with 24.7 percent 
of the deaths. 
Table 13 is the breakdown of a regular eight-hour shift into 
three categories. The first category is representative of the first 
half of the work shift; it is the time when 24.1 percent of the work-
related deaths occurred. The second half of the shift, hours 5-8, 
had 20 . 4 percent of the ·deaths. The third category is for the 9+ 
hour shift (those deaths which occurred after the first eight hours 
Computer 
Code 
0 
1 
2 
3 
Computer 
Code 
0 
1 
2 
3 
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TABLE 12 
TIME OF DAY 
Time of Day Number of Work-related 
(24-hour clock) Fatalities % 
No time given 14 ·8.6 
8:01-16:00 (Day Shift) 76 46.9 
16:01-24:00 (Swing Shift) 40 24.7 
0:01-8:00 (Graveyard Shift) 32 19.8 
Total 162 
TABLE 13 
HOUR OF SHIFT 
Number of Work-related 
Hour of Shift Fatalities % 
No time given 70 43.2 
1st-4th (first half) 39 24.1 
5th-8th (second half) 33 20.4 
9th + 20 12.3 
Total 162 
of a shift). In the third category there were 20 deaths or 12.3 per-
cent of the total. 
The "normal" five-day work week is Monday through Friday. Table 
14 represents the seven-day week divided into three sets of days. 
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TABLE 14 
DAY OF THE WEEK 
Computer Number of Work-related 
Code Day of the Week Fatalities % 
0 No day given 0 
1 Monday, Tuesday 63 38.9 
2 Wednesday, Thursday 49 30.2 
3 Friday, Saturday, Sunday 50 30.9 
Total 162 
During Monday and Tuesday, the first set, 38.9 percent of the deaths 
occurred. During the second set of days, Wednesday and Thursday, 30.2 
percent of the fatalities occurred. Finally during the third set of 
days, known as the "weekend period" Friday, Saturday and Sunday, 
30.9 percent of the fatalities occurred. 
Table 15 is representative of the amount of money being earned 
by the victim per week at the time of his or her death. Twenty-eight 
and four tenths percent of the victims were earning $200.00 or less. 
In the larger middle ground, 48.8 percent were earning between $200.00-
$400.00. Only 9.9 percent were earning over $400 .00 at the time of 
their death. 
In Table 16 the percentages shown are of those victims who were 
working a work week of 1-5 days, or those who worked six and seven 
days per week. The larger number of fatalities occurred within the 
first group, those who worked 1-5 days per week. Thus 64.2 percent 
Computer 
Code 
0 
1 
2 
3 
TABLE 15 
PAY SCALE 
Pay Scale 
(Dollars per Week) 
No scale given 
$001. OD-$200. 00 
$201.00-$400.00 
$401.00 + 
Total 
TABLE 16 
34 
Number of Work-related 
Fat ali ties % 
21 12.9 
46 28.4 
79 48.8 
16 9.9 
162 
DAYS WORKED PER WEEK 
Computer Number of Work-related 
Code Days per Week Fatalities % 
0 Number of days not given 22 13.6 
1 1-5 104 64 . 2 
2 6, 7 36 22.2 
Total 162 
of the fatalities occurred in the fi rst group while 22.2 percent of 
the fatalities occurred io the second group, those who were working six 
or seven days per week. 
In Table 17 the hours worked per day by the victim are arranged 
into two groups, 1-8 hours per day and 9+ hours per day. Of the 
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TABLE 17 
HOURS WORKED PER DAY 
Computer Number of Work-related 
Code Hours Worked per Day Fatalities % 
0 No time given 24 14.8 
1 1-8 95 58.6 
2 9 + 43 26.6 
Total 162 
work-related fatalities for the three year period, 58.6 percent 
occurred in the first group, those working 1-8 hours per day. Of the 
victims, 26.6 percent were working a nine-hour day or longer. 
Statistical measurement 
This study was intended to test the null hypothesis between 
the common denominators, the Standard Industrial Classifications, and 
the Occupational Groups. In order to test the strength of the common 
denominators the x2 statistical test was used. The statistic is as 
follows: 
2 
X 
2 ( fo fe) 
fe 
where: fo observed frequency 
fe expected frequency (null-hypothetical) 
L is taken over all categories. 
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The data was the complete population of work-related fatalities 
in Utah for the years 1976-1978. A confidence level of .OS was used 
to establish the significant difference. Using a one-tailed test with 
a = .OS, we would reject when: 
x
2 
> 3. 84 when df = 1 x2 > 5.99 when df 2 
df k - 1 where- k = the number of categories. 
The procedure to be followed will be to state the null hypo-
thesis, presentation of the data in Tables 18-33, and a statement 
of acceptance or rejection of the hypothesis. 
The sign of (---) in the x2 column and the sign (NV) in the 
act i on - taken column is an indication that the area did not have 
enough work-related fatalities in the combined total to use the x2 
statistical measurement. 
Findings 
Age as compared with Occupational Groups and Standard Industrial 
Classifications. 
Hypothesis: There is no significant difference in the age of 
those classif ied as work-related fatalities, in the Occupational Group 
or the Industrial Classification. 
As shown in Table 18, the null hypothesis is rejected in the 
followi ng areas: Craftsmen & Operatives, Transportation, and Laborers 
& Fa rm Wo r kers . The hypothesis i s also r e j ec t ed i n Table 19 in t he 
followin g Industrial Classifications--Mining, and Transportation, 
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TABLE 18 
AGE AS COMPARED WITH OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS 
Occupational Groups 
Crit x2 x2 
Action 
and Codes Taken 
Prof. & Mgr. 1 5.99 3.86 accept 
Sales & Clerical 2 5.99 3.76 accept 
Crafts & Oper. 3 5.99 19.42 reject 
Transportation 4 5.99 15.54 reject 
Laborers & Farm 5 5.99 10.23 reject 
Service & Prof. Ser. 6 5.99 • 76 accept 
a 
- .05 df - 2 
TABLE 19 
AGE AS COMPARED WITH INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATIONS 
Standard Industrial 
Crit x2 x2 
Action 
Classifications and Codes Taken 
Mining 2 5.99 11.54 reject 
Construction 3 5.99 3.26 accept 
Manufacturing 4 5.99 3.27 accept 
Transportation 5 s. 99 8.42 reject 
Combined 6 5.99 4.37 accept 
a - . 05 df 2 
because there is significant differences in those areas as shown by 
the x2 value. 
Months of employment as compared with Occupational Groups and 
Standard Industrial Classifications. 
Hypothesis: There is no significant difference in the amount 
of time a person classified as a work-related death had worked for 
the employer and the Occupational Group or Industrial Classification. 
The null hypothesis is rejected in Table 20 in the following 
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areas: Craftsmen & Operatives, and Transportation. Listed in Table 21 
are the rejected areas of Mining, Construction, and Transportation 
because there are significant differences in the amount of time the 
employee had spent on the job in those areas according to the ~ values. 
TABLE 20 
MONTHS OF EMPLOYMENT AS COMPARED WITH OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS 
Occupational Groups 
Grit x2 x2 
Action 
and Codes Taken 
Prof. & Mgr. 1 5.99 ---* NV* 
Sales & Clerical 2 5.99 --* NV* 
Craft. & Oper. 3 5.99 135.10 Reject 
Transportation 4 5.99 99.77 Reject 
Laborers & Farm 5 5.99 ---* NV* 
Ser. & Prot. Serv. 6 5.99 
--* NV* 
Cl - .OS df - 2 
*The sign of (---) in the ~ column and the sign of (NV) in the Action 
Taken column is an indication that the area of the table did not have 
enough work-related fatalities in the combined total to use the x2. 
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TABLE 21 
MONTHS OF EMPLOYMENT AS COMPARED WITH INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATIONS 
Standard Industrial 
Grit x2 x2 
Action 
Classifications and Codes Taken 
Mining 2 5.99 8.28 reject 
Construction 3 5.99 15.99 :teject 
Manufacturing 4 5 . 99 .91 accept 
Transportation 5 5.99 18.51 reject 
Combined 6 5.99 4.19 accept 
"= 
. 05 df - 2 
Time on the job as compared with Occupational Groups and Standard 
Industrial Classifications. 
Hypothesis: There is no significant difference between the amount 
of time an employee has worked at a job before being killed and the 
Occupational Group or the Industrial Classification. 
As indicated in Tables 22 and 23 respectively, the null hypothesis 
is rejected in the following areas: 1) Occupational Groups-- Craftsmen & 
Operatives, and Transportation; 2) Industrial Classifications--Construc-
tion, and Combined, because the x2 values for those groups have shown 
that there are significant differences. 
Time of day as compar ed with Occupational Groups and Standard 
Industrial Classifications. 
Hypothesis: There is no significant difference between the time 
of day the accident occurred and the Occupational Group or the Indus-
trial Classification. 
TABLE 22 
TIME ON THE JOB AS COMPARED WITH OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS 
Occupational Groups 
Crit x2 and Codes 
Prof. & Mgr. 1 5.99 
Sales & Clerical 2 5.99 
Craft. & Oper. 3 5.99 193.58 
Trans. 4 5.99 179.93 
Laborers; Farm 5 5. 99 
Prot. Ser . 6 5.99 
a - . 05 df 2 
TABLE 23 
40 
Action 
Taken 
NV 
NV 
reject 
reject 
NV 
NV 
TIME ON THE JOB AS COMPARED IITTH INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATIONS 
Standard Industrial 
Classifications and Codes 
Mining 2 
Construction 3 
Manufacturing 4 
Transportation 5 
Combined 6 
a - .05 df 
Crit ~ 
5 . 99 
5.99 133.64 
5.99 
5.99 
5.99 133.26 
2 
Action 
Taken 
NV 
reject 
NV 
NV 
reject 
As shown in Table 24, the null hypothesis is rejected in the 
following areas: Professional & Management, Craftsmen & Operatives, 
Laborers, and Farm. As shown in Table 25, the null hypothesis is 
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TABLE 24 
TIME OF DAY AS COMPARED WITH OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS 
Occupational Groups 
Grit x2 x2 
Action 
and Codes Taken 
Prof. & Mgr. 1 5.99 92.45 reject 
Sales & Clerical 2 5.99 1. 75 accept 
Craft. & Oper. 3 5.99 17.99 reject 
Transportation 4 5.99 1.20 accept 
Laborers & Farm 5 5.99 12.16 reject 
Serv. & Prot. Serv. 6 5.99 1.00 accept 
a - . OS df - 2 
TABLE 25 
TIME OF DAY AS COMPARED WITH INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATIONS 
Standard Industrial 
Grit x2 x2 
Action 
Classifications and Codes Taken 
Mining 2 5.99 • 32 accept 
Construction 3 5.99 15.07 reject 
Manufacturing 4 5~99 6 . 23 reject 
Transportation 5 5.99 6.99 reject 
Combined 6 5.99 2.36 accept 
a - .OS df - 2 
rejected in the following areas: Construction, Manufacturing, and 
Transportation, because the x2 values that are shown are significantly 
different. 
l 
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Hour of the shift as compared with Occupational Groups and 
Standard Industrial Classifications. 
Hypothesis: There is no significant difference between the 
hour of the shift the accident occurred and the Occupational Group 
or the Industrial Classification. 
The null hypothesis is rejected in the following areas: 1) Table 
26, Occupational Groups--Craftsmen and Operatives; 2) Table 27, Indus-
trial Classifications--Mining, because of the significant differences 
of the x2 value. 
Day of the week as compared with Occupational Group and Standard 
Industrial Classification. 
Hypothesis: There is no significant difference between the day 
of the week the accident occurred and the Occupational Group or the 
Industrial Classification. 
TABLE 26 
HOUR OF THE SHIFT AS COMPARED WITH OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS 
Occupational Groups 
Grit x2 x2 
Action 
and Codes Taken 
Prof. & Mgr. 1 5.99 4. 74 accept 
Sales & Clerical 2 5.99 4 . 00 accept 
Craft. & Oper. 3 5.99 10.31 reject 
Transportation 4 5.99 . 29 accept 
Laborers & Farm 5 5.99 2.00 accept 
Serv. & Prot. Ser. 6 5.99 1.00 accept 
(l = .05 df 2 
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TABLE 27 
HOUR OF THE SHIFT AS COMPARED WITH INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATIONS 
Standard Industrial 
Crit x2 x2 
Action 
Classifications and Codes Taken 
Mining 2 5 . 99 6 . 50 reject 
Construction 3 5. 99 2.80 accept 
Manufacturing 4 5. 99 3.00 accept 
Transportation 5 5.99 .63 accept 
Combined 6 5.99 1.04 accep t 
(l = • OS df 2 
As shown in Table 28, the null hypothesis is accepted in all 
areas. The null hypothesis is rejected for the Combined area in 
Table 29 because of t he significant value of the x2• 
TABLE 28 
DAY OF THE lo/EEK AS COMPARED WITH OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS 
Occupational Groups 
Crit x2 i Action and Codes Taken 
Prof. & Mgr. 1 5 . 99 1.18 accept 
Sales & Cl erical 2 5. 99 o . oo accept 
Crafts & Oper. 3 5.99 .19 accept 
Transportation 4 s. 99 4.62 accept 
Laborers & Farm 5 5 . 99 .15 accept 
Serv. & Prot . Ser . 6 5.99 5.44 accept 
(l - .os df 2 
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TABLE 29 
DAY OF THE WEEK AS COMPARED WITH INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATIONS 
Standard Industrial 
Grit x2 x2 
Action 
Classifications and Codes Taken 
Mining 2 5.99 1. 54 accept 
Construction 3 5.99 1. 80 accept 
Manufacturing 4 5. 99 1.68 accept 
Transportation 5 5.99 1.14 accept 
Combined 6 5. 99 7.09 reject 
Ct - .OS df 2 
Days per week as compared with Occupational Group and Standard 
Industrial Classification. 
Hypothesis: There is no significant difference between the days 
worked per week by the victim and the Occupational Group or the 
Industrial Classification. 
The null hypothesis is rejected in two areas in Table 30, 
Craftsmen and Operatives. The hypothesis is also rejected for the 
following Industrial Classifications as shown in Table 31: Mining, 
Construction, Manufacturing, and Combined, because of the significant 
values of -£2. 
Hours per day as compared with Occupational Groups and Standard 
Industrial Classifications. 
Hypothesis: There is no significant difference between hours 
worked per day by the victim and the Occupational Group or the Indus-
trial Classification. 
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TABLE 30 
DAYS PER WEEK AS COMPARED WITH OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS 
Occupational Groups 
Crit x2 x2 
Action 
and Codes Taken 
Prof. & Mgr. 1 3.84 0.00 accept 
Sales & Clerical 2 3.84 NV 
Craft. & Oper. 3 3.84 24.32 reject 
Transportation 4 3.84 1. 88 accept 
Laborers & Farm 5 3.84 .08 accept 
Serv. & Prot. Ser. 6 3. 84 NV 
a = .05 df 1 
TABLE 31 
DAYS PER WEEK AS COMPARED WITH INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATIONS 
Standard Industrial 
Crit x2 x2 
Action 
Classifications and Codes Taken 
Mining 2 3.84 4.17 reject 
Construction 3 3.84 8.53 reject 
Manufacturing 4 3.84 20.57 reject 
Transportation 5 3.84 .20 accept 
Combined 6 3.84 11.11 reject 
a = .OS df 1 
From Tables 32 and 33 it can be seen that the null hypothesis is 
rejected in the following areas: 1) Occupational Groups--Craftsmen and 
Operatives; 2) Industrial Classifications--Mining, Construction, 
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TABLE 32 
HOURS PER DAY AS COMPARED WITH OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS 
Occupational Groups 
Crit x2 x2 
Action 
and Codes Taken 
Prof. & Mgr. 1 3.84 .04 accept 
Sales & Clerical 2 3. 84 NV 
Craft. & Oper. 3 3.84 44.08 reject 
Transportation 4 3.84 2.31 accept 
Laborers & Farm 5 3.84 o.oo accept 
Serv. & Prot. Ser. 6 3. 84 NV 
a = • OS df 1 
TABLE 33 
HOURS PER DAY AS COMPARED WITH INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATIONS 
Standard Industrial 
Crit x2 x2 
Action 
Classifications and Codes Taken 
Mining 2 3.84 4. 84 reject 
Construction 3 3.84 7.76 reject 
Manufacturing 4 3.84 5.14 reject 
Transportation 5 3. 84 5.00 reject 
Combined 6 3.84 8.53 reject 
a - .os df - 1 
Manufacturing, Transportation, and Combined because of the significant 
differences as shown by the values of~. 
CHAPTER IV 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Each year in the United States thousands of workers lose their 
lives to work-related accidents. This tragic loss of manpower cost 
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the nation billions of dollars in wage loss, medical expenses, insurance 
administration, property damage and indirect work loss. 
The prevention of work-related accidents, especially those that 
might result in a death, should be high on the list of priorities of 
every employer. The knowledge of the cause of accidents can be one 
of the best tools in their prevention. 
The purpose of this study was to determine if there were any 
colliJllOn denominators and how they correlated to the work-related fatal·-
ities reported in Utah for the years 1976-1978. 
The objectives of this study were to determine the following: 
1. If there were any common denominators involved with the work-
related fatalities in Utah for the years 1976-1978. 
2. The statistical significance of the common denominators. 
3. The strength of the correlation between the common denominators 
and the ten Industrial Classifications. 
4. The strength of the correlation between the common denomin-
ators and the eleven Occupational Groups. 
5. The implications for training programs as related to the 
common denominators involved with the work-related fatalities. 
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A review of literature in Abstracts of Instructional Materials 
in Vocational and Technical Education, Abstracts of Research Materials 
in Vocational and TBchnical Education, and Abstracts of Current Journals 
in Education, revealed no data dealing with the study of work-related 
fatalities in any form. A review of Educational Research Information 
Center revealed one study dealing with work-related fatalities and 
mortality rate. The best source of literature was found to be the 
Work-Related Abstracts, wherein several studies were found which dealt 
with work-related accidents and death. 
In the studies several references were made to the theory that 
many factors can influence accident rates, such as age, time on the 
job, and on-the-job training. 
During the period of January 1, 1976 to December 31, 1978, 
there were 162 work-related fatalities in the state of Utah reported 
to the Industrial Commission . 
The data for each of the 162 fatalities in this s tudy was ob-
t ained from the "Employer's First Report of Injury" forms that had 
been fi led with the State Industrial Commis sion. 
In examining the data the following areas were analyzed to 
determine if common denominators were present: Nature of the Injury, 
Part of the Body Affected, Source of the Injury, Accident Type, Age 
of the Victim, Sex of the Victim, Marital Status, Length of Time with 
the Employer, Time at the Same Position, Time of Day , Hour of the 
Shift, Day of the Week, Wage Scale, Hours Worked per Day, and Days 
Worked per Week. 
To determine the significance and strength of the common 
denominators the following eight hypotheses were established relating 
to the variables. 
1. There is no significant difference in the ages of those 
classified as work-related fatalities, in the Occupational Group or 
Industrial Classification. 
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2. There is no significant difference in the amount of time 
the people classified as a work-related fatality had worked for their 
employers and the Occupational Group or the Industrial Classification. 
3. There is no significant difference between the amount of 
time an employee had worked at a job before being killed and the 
Occupational Group or the Industrial Classification. 
4. There is no significant difference between the time of day 
the accident occurred and the Occupational Group or the Industrial 
Classification. 
5. There is no significant difference between the hour of the 
shift when the accident occurred and the Occupational Group or the 
Industrial Classification. 
6. There is no significant difference between the day of the 
week the accident occurred and the Occupational Group or the Industrial 
Classification. 
7. There is no significant difference between the days worked 
per week by the victim and the Occupational Group or the Industrial 
Classification. 
8. There is no significant difference between the hours worked 
per day by the victim and the Occupational Group or the Industrial 
Classification. 
Finding number 27 dealing with identification of the common 
denominators is related to objectives one and two. Findings numbers 
8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 23, 24, 25, and 26, 
dealing with the strength of the common denominators are related to 
objectives three, four, and five. 
Findings 
1. There were 162 work-related deaths in Utah for the years 
1976-1978. 
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2. The number of the fatalities and the percentages were classi-
fied under the Standard Industrial Classification system as follows: 
Agriculture- 1 (.6%); Mining- 26 (16.1%); Construction- 30 (18.5%); 
Manufacturing- 37 (22.8%); Transportation- 28 (17.3%); Combined-
38 (23.5%), and No Group Identified- 2 (1.2%). 
3. The number of fatalities and the percentages were classi-
fied under the Occupational Groups as follows: Professional & Mana-
gers- 22 (13.6%); Sales & Clerical- 9 (5.6%); Craftsman & Operatives-
63 (38.9%); Transportation- 48 (29.6%); Laborers & Farm- 13 (8.0%); 
and Services & Protective Services - 7 (4.3%). 
4. A breakdown of the Nature of Injury is as follows: Lacera-
tions, Dislocations, Fractures, and Mult. Inj. - 104 (64.2%); Asphyxia, 
Systemic Effects, Heart Attack, & Other- 48 (29.6%); and Burns & 
Electrocution- 10 (6.2%). 
5. The fatalities categorized according to Part of the Body Injured 
were: Head and Neck- 26 (16.1%); Trunk- 7 (4.3%); Upper and Lower 
Extremities- 2 (1.2%); Multiple Parts- 83 (51.2%); and Body Systems-
44 (27.2%). 
6. Under the classification of Source of the Injury the fatal-
ities were separated as follows: Objects- 41 (24.3%); Machinery & 
Equipment- 23 (14.2%); Motor-vehicle- 76 (46.9%); and Other- 22 
(13.6%). 
7. The Type of Accident divided the fatalities as follows: 
Fall, Struck, Abraded, Body Reaction, and Overexertion- 97 (59.9%); 
Public Transportation- 16 (9.9%); and Motor-vehicle- 49 (30.2%). 
8. The victims were divided by age as follows: Fourteen to 
20 years old- 12 (7.4%); 21-40 years old- 96 (59.37.); 41-60 years 
old- 38 (23.5%); and 60+ years old- 14 (8.6%). 
9. The first hypothesis stated that there is no significant 
difference in the age of those classified as work-related fatalities 
by the Occupational Group or by the Industrial Classification. 
The following areas were rejected because of the significant concen-
trations of fatalities according to the age categories: Occupational 
Groups--Transportation, Craftsmen & Operatiwes , and Laborer & Farm; 
Industrial Classifications--Mining, and Transportation. 
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10. There were 160 males and two females reported as work-related 
fatalities during the three year period. 
11. Out of the 162 fatalities, 127 (78.4%) were married, 29 
(17.9%) were single and 6 (3.7%) were divorced or separated. 
12. The amount of time the victim had worked for the employer 
is broken down by months, and the number of fatalities and the per-
centages are as follow: 1-12 months--79 (48.8%); 13-60 months--39 
(24.0%); 61+ months--28 (17.2%); and no time listed--16 (9.9%). 
13. The second hypothesis stated that there is no significant 
difference between the amount of time the victim had been working for 
the employer and the Occupational Group or the Industrial Classifica-
tion. The following areas were rejected because of the significant 
differences in the amount of time the victim had worked for the 
employer: Occupational Groups--Craftsmen & Operatives, and Transpor-
tation; Industrial Classifications--Mining, Construction, and Trans-
portation. 
14. The amount of time the victim had worked at the job is 
broken down and the number of fatalities and the percentages are as 
follow: 1-12 months--77 (47.5%); 13-60 months--18 (11.1%); 61+ 
months--8 (4.9%); and no time listed--59 (36.5%). 
15. The third hypothesis stated that there is no significant 
difference between the amount of time the victim had worked on the 
job and the Occupational Group or the Industrial Classification. 
The following areas were rejected because of the significant differ-
ences in the amount of time the victim had worked on the job: 
Occupational Groups--Craftsmen & Operatives, and Transportation; 
Industrial Classifications--Construction and Combined. 
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16. There were 76 fatalities (46.9%) during the hours of 8 a.m. 
to 4 p.m., 40 fatalities (24.7%) between 4 p.m. and 12 a.m., and 32 
fatalities (19.8%) between 12 a.m. and 8 a.m. There were 14 fatalities 
(8.6%) with no time of the accident listed. 
17. The fourth hypothesis stated that there is no significant 
difference between the time of day the accident occurred and the 
Occupational Group or the Industrial Classification. The following 
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areas were rejected because of the significant differences in the time 
of day the accident had occurred : Occupational Groups--Professional 
& Management, Craftsmen & Operatives, and Laborers & Farm; Industrial 
Classifications--Construction, Manufacturing, and Transportation. 
18. During the first four hours of the shift there were 39 
fatalities (24.1%), during the second four hours of the shift there 
were 33 fatalities (20.4%), and after the first eight hours of the 
shift there were 20 fatalities (12.3%). There were 70 fatalities 
(43.2%) with no time of the shift listed. 
19. The fifth hypothesis stated that there is no significant 
difference between the hour of the shift the accident occurred and 
the Occupational Group or the Industrial Classification. The follow-
ing areas were rejected because of significant differences in the 
hour of the shift when the accident occurred: Occupational Groups--
Craftsmen & Operatives; Industrial Classifications--Mining. 
20. There were 63 fatalities . (38.9%) on Monday or Tuesday , 
49 fatalities (30.2%) on Wednesday or Thursday, and 50 fatalit i es 
(30 . 9%) on Friday, Saturday or Sunday. 
21. The sixth hypothesis stated that there is no significant 
difference between the day of the week the accident occurred and the 
Occupational Group or the Industrial Classification. The following 
areas were rej ected because of the significant differences in the 
days of the week when the accident occurred: Industrial Classifica-
tions--Combined. 
22. In the area of wage scale the fatalities and percentages 
were as follows: $001.00- $200.00/week--46 fatalities (28.4%); 
$201.00- $400.00/week--79 fatalities (48.8%); $400.00+/week--16 
fatalities (9.9%); and no wage scale listed--21 fatalities (12 . 9%). 
23. In the category of days worked per week the fatalities 
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and percentages were divided as follows: one to five days/week--104 
(64.2%); six or seven days/week--36 (22.2%); and no days/week listed--
22 (13.6%). 
24. The seventh hypothesis stated that there is no significant 
difference between the amount of days worked per week by the victim 
and the Occupational Group or the Industrial Classification. The 
following areas were rejected because of the significant differences 
in the amount of days the victim worked per week: Occupational 
Group--Craftsmen & Operatives; Industrial Classifications--Mining·, 
Construction, Manufacturing, and Combined. 
25. The category of hours worked per day was divided as follows: 
one-eight--95 fatalities (58.6%); nine+ hours--43 fatalities (26.6%); 
and no hours/day listed--24 fatalities (14.8%). 
26. The eighth hypothesis stated that there is no significant 
difference between the number of hours the victim was working per day 
and the Occupational Groups or the Industrial Classification. The 
following areas were rejected because of the significant differences 
in the number of hours the victim was working: Occupational Groups--
Craftsmen & Operatives; Industrial Classifications--Mining, Construction, 
Manufacturing, Transportation, and Combined. 
27. Of the 15 areas of information (Nature, Part, Sourc~ Type, 
Age, Sex, Marital Status, Months of Employment, Months on the Job, 
Time of Day, Hour of the Shift, Day of the Week, Pay Scale, Days 
Worked per Week and Hours Worked per Day) eight were determined to 
be significant common denominators. They were Age, Months of Employ-
ment, Months on the Job, Time of Day, Hour of the Shift, Day of the 
Week, Days Worked per Week and Hours Worked per Day. 
To determine their strength, each of the eight common denomina-
tors was statistically analyzed in comparison with the eleven Occupa-
tional Groups and the ten Standard Industrial Classifications. 
General conclusions 
It can be concluded from this study that there are many factors 
that can influence work-related accidents and fatalities. Several of 
the common denominators identified in this study are quite weak in 
their effect upon work-related accidents but at the same time there 
are two common denominators that are very strong as accident influ-
encing factors . Time on the Job and Age are the two strongest common 
denominators as identified in this study. 
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It can be concluded that there is a need to offset the influence 
of Time on the Job and Age. It also can be concluded that there is a 
need to offset the effects of any factors which can negatively influ-
ence the accident and fatality rates. 
Although many areas of this study have shown large numbers of 
fatalities concentrated by groups, it is inappropriate to conclude 
that the areas a re significant without knowing the corresponding per-
centages of the work force involved in each group. 
Recommendations 
The recommendations that may be drawn from the findings and 
conclusions of 'this study are listed below. 
1. It is recommended that training programs be developed and 
implemented in the following areas to help offset the influence of 
Time on the Job, and Age: (a) Extensive preemployment training in 
the areas of safety and health to the end of making the new employee 
aware of the dangers. (b) Ongoing training in safety and health to 
the end of keeping the employee aware of the dangers. (c) More in-
depth training for those of the younger age categories to help offset 
the influence of age. 
2. It is recommended that research should be conducted again 
into the area of common denominators that are involved not only in 
accidents that result in fatalities but those that are an influence 
in all work-related accidents. The value of the research could be 
increased by taking in larger populations or wider distributions . 
56 
3. It is recommended that research be conducted into the 
correlation between the percentages of the work force in Utah and the 
percentages of the fatalities as determined by the common denominators. 
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APPENDIX 
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EM PLOY ER'S FIRST REPORT OF INJURY 
Do NOT Use Then Sp~teet 
O R IG . INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION CC I NSURANCE CARRIER CC EMPL O Y EE 
Th•s fo rm co M atns al l •tems requt \ted on OSHA For m 101 -
··supple mentary Reco rd of Occupiot tonat lntu rtn and Illnesses' ' 
THE lnduttrial Commin ion o f Ut ith 350 E"n 500 South Sitl t lake City, Uuh 841 11 
1. EMPLO YER 'S NAME 
2. UNEMPLOY MENT INSURANC E NUMBER 
~ 3. MA IL ADDRESS ..... ... ......... ... .. ZiP ... ..... ..... Phone ... . 
! ;: ~~~~~~~~~FB~;,~~:NT FROM- ~Ail -~~~~-~-~~ 
6. IIMPORTANTI NAME OF INSURANCE CAR RIER 
7. REPO RT OF INJURY WAS MADE TO ........ ,,. ....., •• 
.. ............ i,.c;;;;;.:.;.;i·--·· 
8. NAME OF INJURED EMPLO YEE ... Date o f Btnh .. ______ __ 
9. HOME ADDRESS .... 
. .................. i·z-;,;j--
10. SOCI A L SECUR IT Y NUMBE R ..................... .... MAR ITAL STATUS AG E ............ SEX 
II . OCCUPATION 
0 12 . ! 13. LENGTH OF T IME EMPLOYED BY ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYER .. . ..... Tlf.JE IN SAME POSIT ION DEPARTMENT 
I··· j ! 5. NUMBER OF HOURS WO RK ED PER DAY ....... NUMBER OF DAYS EMPLOYEE WORKS PER WEEK ... WAG ES· PER HOUR S .................. OR PEA DAYS .... OR PEA WEEKS ............. .. OR PER MONTHS 
j l6. 
I 17. 
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HMPOATANTl N AME OF WIF E AND OTHER MINOR DEPENDE NTS AND THEI R (! l AT H OATES: 
1j-·--g --------- - Birthdate Pre sent Add ress 
-~ 
.., 
~ ] 
18 . DATE of INJU RY o r DIAG NOSIS OF ILLNESS .... • ....... HOUR OF DAY .............. HOUR SHIFT COMMENCED 
19. INJUR ED LEFT WORK .. . .. .... IF SO, GI VE DA TE .. 
HAS INJURED RETURN ED TO WORK ... . ...... IF SO. GIV E DAT E.. . . . .................... .. 
20. WAS PLACE OF ACCIDEN T OR EXPOSURE ON EMPLOYER 'S PREMISES .. .......... WAS INJURY FATAL 
2 1. IF SO. GIVE DAT E OF DEA TH .. . ......... PLACE OF ACCIDENT OR EXPOSUA E .. 
23 
24. 
25. 
. ..... ic;,·:.·.;;:,;;····--
Il l tt o ccurred on employe r · ~ v r~m t s~:s y•vc achlt<·n o f p i<J n t o r e~ ta ll l tshmcu t tn whoch •t occurred 
n tt o ccurred outs•de em fllov er '\ vr c m•~··~ sta re ,orldr eis 01 p rov1dt.: 11lace reft!f e nccs loc.:u mg p lace o f lllfUIV u accu r;uely as pon1bl~ . l 
WHAT WAS EMPLO YEE DO ING WHEN INJURED 
IBt Sl)t'Colic - d he w.u ustrtg tools o r euw pmcn t. ll.lm tt them iol ld tell what he was domg w•th them.l 
HOW 0 10 THE ACCIDEN T OCC UR 
! Dc~c• •be fuH v th~ events. qn.-., lu ll d ct .11h o n J ll LJt' to rs wlm:h Jed o r contr •I.Ju tcd to the ~codent.l 
NAME THE OBJECT OR SUBSTANCE WH ICH DIRECTL Y INJURED THE EMPLOYEE .. 
I Fo r Clii.J mu lc . thL' m ,,ch ot •e o• thmq he str uc k J y ... m t o r wh1ch ~ tr ue!.. h1m . tl,e v o~por o r po •son he mh aled o • swa: lowed : thll chemica l 
or r.KIIa t ton whoch tr ottarel1 h• ~ s lo. m . ' " 111 c.t~cs o f \ t • <~ • ••s. hcrm'"· etc .. the th " IQ he wa~ l<f l tng. pu ll1ng , e tc. I 
26. INDiCATE TH E PAR T OF BODY A FFE CTED AND DESCRIB E TH E INJURY OR IL LN ESS IN DETAI L ..... 
27 . A TT ENDING PHYSICIAN .. 
2B. HQSPIT Al . 
ADDRESS ..... . 
. . . . ADDRESS .. 
S IGNATU~Eof veuonmakmgrepon TITLE . DA TE ... . 
1$ ogn on t n ~ l IT h, •eno• o M"" Oe Soq<•- Bv f. of'Otov• • 0• ~•••on Oth e< Th • n In""•" t"'<>•o v e e l 
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